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Abstract
The  paper  examines  empirically,  the  effects  of  corruption  on  inequality  of  income  and  economic
growth.  Firstly,  the  long  run  structural  relationship  is  examined  through  the  technique  of
Autoregressive  distributed  lag  model  (ARDL).  Secondly,  the  causality  relationship  is  measured
empirical  results  suggest  a  long  run  relationship  between  corruption,  inequality  of  income  and
economic growth in the Nigeria. Emphasizing on the channels of influence of growth, the finding, in
the dynamic corruption equation indicates that the coefficient of the economic growth is significantly
negative. This implies that despite much rhetoric to the contrary fighting corruption in Nigeria requires
resources. More so, the finding suggests inequality of income directly impact on economic growth.
This  implies that  economic growth rises  with inequality of  income.  The policy implication is  that
Nigeria economic growth problems are structural as such fighting corruption require huge economic
resources.
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1. Introduction 
The interconnectivity among corruption, inequality of income and economic growth has been an area
of considerable debate. Since recently, in both research directions, an increasing attention has been
made  to  measure  the  more  precise  channels,  through  which  corruption  and  inequality  of  income
impulse for growth could be generated. The major jolt to this development thinking emerged due to the
practical experience reflected in the rate at which the economic growth of some the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa is growing rapidly in the midst of poor governance and corruptions (Yusuf, Malarvizhi
& Khin 2013). A typical case here, is   one of the oil rich country Nigeria, which recent data have
indicated that economic growth of Nigeria rose to the average of 7% since 2006, and inequality rose
from 0.429 in 2004 to 0.447 in 2010 (NBS, 2011). In the mist of these rising economic growth and
inequality of income the country continues to show high rates of corruption and poor governance. In
fact, a recent report of the International transparency global corruption ranking, ranked Nigeria the 3rd
most corrupt country in the West African region.  The report ranked Nigeria 144 of 177 countries out of
which data are made available (IT 2013). 
This apparent paradox of rising economic growth with high level of corruption raised the issues of
concerned among different studies on whether corruption was beneficial or harmful to the growth and
under  what  circumstance  the  channels  of  influence  does  it  affects  economic  growth.   Thus,  the
dominant literature such as the study of (Mauro, 1995,  Knack, & Keefer, 1997, Gupta, Davoodi &
Alonso- term 2002) reports empirical evidences confirming that corruptions are much more damaging
in a context where corruptions is higher as results of growth –retarding pattern of accumulation. They
went further to argue that corruptions lowers investment and consequently, economic growth. But the
findings  of  these  studies  are  doubtful.  For  one  hand,  they  failed  to  provide  a  clear  transmission
mechanism through which corruption retards economic growth. Secondly these types of studies heavily
draw conclusion on cross- country panel data analysis ignoring the country unique context specificity. 
Even though there are quite a number of country specific case studies such as the studies of Adenike
(2013), Uma and Eboh (2013), Ajie and Wokekoro (2012),  Agba, (2010),  Aliyu and, Elijah   (2008)
these studies are not far free from certain limitations.  As most of these studies have failed to pay much
attention to other channels of the transmission mechanism through which corruption affect economic
growth such as inequality of income, which causes potential bias of endogeneity and missing variables.
 
This  study contributes  in  various  ways,  in  filling  the  existing  gaps  in  the  literature  1)  including
inequality of income in the channels of influence between corruption and economic growth
 (2) Utilizing both conventional and structural break unit root test. (3) Employing the ARDL bound
testing approach to Co integration for a long run relationship between the variables in the presence of
structural breaks (4) Using Vector error correction mechanism to determine the causality relationship
both in the long run and short causality.
The  main  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  determine  the  long  run  and  causal  relationships  between
corruption and economic growth by including inequality of income in the transmission mechanism.
With this background introduction, the remaining parts of the paper is structured as follows: Section
two of the paper consists of material and methods, while section three provides the empirical results
and section four presents the discussions and the conclusion of the paper.
2. Literature Review 
Theoretically, the literature reaches no consensus about the effect of corruption on economic growth.
Some of the studies hold the views that corruption might have been beneficial to economic growth
( Leff, 1964, Huntington 1968, Khan 1998, 2002 and Chang- Ju Huang 2012).  Corruption stimulates
bureaucrats  to  provide  more  efficient  government  services,  and  it  enables  an  easiest  ways  for
entrepreneurs  to  dodge  inefficient  regulations.  Corruption  could  result  in  more  efficient  resource
allocation. In the sense that every poor country could be analyzed as having restrictive rules in certain
sectors and also in private monopolies
On the contrary corruption may corruption constrains economic growth by hindering both internal and
external productive investments through tax and discouraging entrepreneur manpower development,
which  will,  in  turn,  reduce  economic  growth  and  decline  in  economic  growth.  In  another  way,
corruption reduces the quality of social infrastructures such as roads, electricity, housing, and water
supply. Corruption also diverts marginal talent into rent seeking, which discourages the composition of
public  expenditure.  Corruption  also  reduces  tax  revenue  where  entrepreneurs  are  diverted  into  an
informal arrangement of excessive rent taking which reduces taxes in exchange due to excessive rent
taking by the officials. In fact, corruption may lead to lower output due to low level of investment and
low level of output (Mo, Pak Hung, 2001, Gupta et al 2002, Gyimah- Brempong 2002).
Thus, among the well-recognized development literature the pioneering work of Mauro (1995) suggests
that corruption is harmful to economic growth. Mauro uses assembled data of a selected number of
both advance and poor countries. The study employed the technique of single equation analysis through
the OLS using some instrumental  variables.  The findings provide evidence of negative impacts of
corruption on economic growth. The transmission of mechanism was traced to human man capital
development.  The problem with  Mauro study is  the  omission  variable  basis.[1] Eichengreen,  and
Gupta, (2011) use Meta study of 72 empirical findings through the method of fixed and random effects
analysis. Equally he implored weighted means to test the precision effects. The empirical results of his
study suggest that corruption causes a decline in per-capita income and that corruption relatively affects
economic  growth  in  mixed  countries  than  the  poor  countries.  In  a  more  recent  development
Eichengreen, and Gupta, (2011) pointed out that human capital serves as a transmission mechanism
through which corruption affects economic growth. However, their study is one of the recent studies
that provide a synthesis of the existing evidence on the relationship between corruption and economic
growth. However, the study of  Eichengreen, and Gupta is not free from criticisms; their study was
attacked on the basis of their inability to engage in the bigger debate on historical causality which
almost impossible to establish using econometric data analysis. 
Barbier,  (2010)   examines  the  causal  linkage  between  corruption  long  run  economic  growth  and
adjusted saving rate within the sample of African countries and Asia economies from 1970 to 2003.
 Empirical evidence from his study reveals that corruption has been the major impediment affecting
African countries to re-invest rent- driving investment in a short run period of time. Thus he pointed
out that in Asian countries, corruption play insignificant role in undermining growth due to their focus
on resource driven growth. His study suggests that African demand effective management strategy of
combating  corruption.  However,  the  critics  of  Barbier  study  argue  that  reading  too  much  into
correlation regressions may  have unintended consequences, understanding corruption in Africa goes
beyond correlation regression, but demand historical explanation on how to address structural problems
of corruption and economic growth. 
 Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009)  focused to find out why some countries with high corruption
still experiencing high growth performance. They use the technique of dynamic general equilibrium
model.  The results  of  their  findings  reveal  that  whether  corruption is  detrimental  to  growth or  no
defend on the way bureaucrats organized and co-ordinate their rent-seeking attitudes. They went further
to  demonstrate  that  in  a  situation  where  corruption  is  well  coordinated  and  properly  managed,
corruption can lead to higher rate of economic growth. 
The work of Lambsdorff (2007) co-opted the ratio of GDP to capital stock to measure average capital
productivity. His empirical finding reveals a negative impact of corruption on the average ration of
capital productivity. This suggests that the role of inequality of income in corruption and economic
growth relationship has been neglected in this  literature  Bardhan (2006,  Mauro,  1995,  Knack, and
Keefer, 1997, Tanzi, and Davoodi 1997) examine the long run relationship between corruption and
economic growth through the least square method. Thus, these studies did not consider the role of the
integration and co- integration property of the series. This draws doubt, really, on what their model
estimated. It is representing a structural long run equilibrium relationship or a spurious one? This study
takes this issue seriously and considers the possibility of filling in the vacuum. This paper contributes
to the existing body of literatures by introducing inequality of income into the competing debate. In this
regards we also address the general methodological problems in the following ways:
Several studies have discussed a relationship between corruption and income inequality. The theoretical
origin  of  this  relationship  is  established  from  rent  theory  which  came  from  the  ideas  of  Rose-
Ackerman (1978) and Krueger (1974). The point is that corruption may generate persistent distortion
from which some certain categories of people gain more than the others.
Chiung-Ju  Huang  (2012)  examines  the  relationship  among  corruption  inequality  of  income  and
economic growth in ten countries in Asia using panel vector error correction approach. The findings do
not support the common views that corruption retard economic growth. The results reveal that increase
in  economic  growth  will  cause  an  increase  in  income inequality.  More  so  an  increase  in  income
inequality will cause an increase in economic growth.
Gyimah-Brempong  (2002)  uses  panel  data  from  African  countries  to  investigate  the  effects  of
corruption on economic growth and income inequality. The findings of the study reveal that corruption
decreases economic growth directly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital.
The results also showed that increased corruption is positively correlated with income inequality.
Li, Xu, and Zou (2000), Gupta et al (2002) and Chong and Calderon (2000a and 2000b) examine the
effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty.  Taking a sample data of a mixed group of
countries  which  comprises  low,  middle  and  advance  countries,  the  findings  suggest  a  U  shaped
relationship  between corruption  and income inequality.  Their  studies  reveal  a  positive  relationship
between corruption and income inequality in advance countries and a negative relationship in poor
countries.
With regards to Nigeria some of the few empirical studies on corruption and economic growth include
the study of Adenike (2013) who examined the impacts of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria
using an annual time series data from 1980-2009, using regression analysis and granger causality test.
The findings of his study suggest that corruption per worker impact negatively on output per worker
directly and impacts indirectly, on the foreign private investment, expenditure on education and capital
expenditure per worker. The study also reveals a one-way causality relationship from output per worker
to corruption per worker.
Age and Wokekoro (2012) examine the inputs of corruption on sustainable economic development
using ordinary least squares. The study finds out that weak institution of governance, dysfunctional
legal  system ,  lack  of  transparency,  high  poverty/unemployment  rate  political  interferences  in  the
operation  of  the  anti  corruption  agencies  constitute  the  major  causes  of  systematic  corruption  in
Nigeria.
In support  of this  views  Agba, (2010)  examines the different  types  of corruption and came to the
conclusion that bureaucratic and political corruption weakens good governance in Nigeria. Therefore,
argued that there is the possibility that corruption may continue to persist in Nigeria due to her low
level of capitalist development.
Adogamhe (2010)  provide indebt study on the relationship between institutional policies of fighting
corruption  and  poverty  reductions,  his  study  focus  on  the  analysis  of  the  National  economic
empowerment development strategies (NEEDS) which was aimed at institutional reforms in Nigeria.
His study demonstrates that poor segment of the Nigerian society are not fully involves in governance.
This according to him may suggest why the level of inequality in income distribution is at a wide
range. Therefore, the program of NEEDS which was aimed at fighting corruption does not deliver the
goods. However,  the problems with the work of Adogamhe is the lack of transmission mechanism
 between corruption to economic growth because the linkage between institutional policies and poverty
is not direct one it pass through the economic growth that is to say economic growth is necessary even
though not sufficient for poverty reductions it depend on the level of income distribution.
Aliyu and Elijah (2008) Study, confirms the long run co-integration among corruption and economic
growth. The problem with this study is their inability to explain the interconnectivity of the channels of
influence, addressing the fundamental problem of simultaneity bias. There are a number of concerns
with the study of Aliyu and Elijah (2008). Although their study have considered the nature of 1 (1)
variable as a condition of integrating the series based on a unit root test and co-integration.   Insufficient
sample size renders their analysis impotent and may lead to misguided conclusions. The study of (Agba
2010) is  one  of  the  current  studies  that  used  trivariate  model  but  his  study focused on causes  of
corruption and economic growth, and the authors found that there are many causes of corruption in
Nigeria and that corruption is inversely related to economic growth. However, his study neglected the
role of inequality of income which calls for the needs of including inequality of income to serve as a
transmission mechanism in the relationship.
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This study utilized both conventional and structural break unit root test and also employed the ARDL 
bound testing approach to Co integration due to the presence of structural breaks. More so this study 
utilizes VECM Granger causality test for testing of both long run and short causality. However, since 
the use of ARDL relied on the time series features of the data this study ensure that the integration 
order is not about 1 (2), because, 1 (2) series integration produces spurious regression. Similarly, if a 
series are found to be integrated in order of 1 (2) the estimated F- test became invalid. Therefore, for 
the sake of the identification of the order of the integration a unit root test is conducted (Narayan, 
2006). This is specified below:
LnGDPt is the Per-capital GDP proxy for economic growth, βi is the constant terms and β2,β3 is the
slope of the coefficients and LnEQt is the Inequality of income, LnCC is the control of corruption and
et is the disturbance terms.
)
- - - - - - - - - - -(4)
In  (2),(3),  ∆  stand for  the  first  difference  operators.   Variable  definitions  are  as  earlier  defined in
equation (1).
Thus the co-integrating long run relationship is established through the following estimate
∂71= ∂72=∂73= 0:∂81=∂82=∂83=∂=0:∂91=∂92=∂93=0 is based on (2), (3).
The estimated result is obtained from the bound testing procedure which compares with a critical value
obtained from the critical values table. The decision rule is that if the estimated F-test values of the
joint significant obtained from the Wald test is greater than the upper critical value the null hypothesis
of no long run relationship is rejected and concludes that there is the presence of long run relationship.
However, on the other hand if the computed F-test of a joint significant obtained from the Wald test
results lies below the lower critical value, we conclude that there is no long run relationship, but should
in case it fall in between then it become indeterminate.  Thus, it should be noted that the existence of
long run co-integration relationship does not simply imply causality. To determine the direction of the
causality error correction test must be conducted through the signing of the ECM then there causality is
determined both in the short run and long run. Therefore, in order to establish the direction of causation
amongst variables, we took the next step of estimating the Error Correction Model (ECM) as suggested
by PSS (Pesaran, H. H., & Shin, Y. 1998) which is specified in equations as follows:
et-  - -
- - - - - - -(5)
 et- - -
- - - - - - -(6)
et  --  -
- - - - -(7)
All equations are definitions follow earlier defined in equation (2), (3), (4) above.
Sensitivity test for the stability of the parameters
A stability test is also conducted in order to determine the stability of the coefficient of 
the series in the equation. The stability of the series was conducted through the 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of recursive 
residuals of square (CUSUMSQ) introduced by (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). The decision 
rule is that, if the plot parallel line of the two tests is found within the 5% critical bounds
the null hypothesis of stability cannot be rejected. On the contrary if the plot parallel 
lines are crossed the null hypothesis of the parameter stability is rejected at the 5 % 
level.
Data are collected from different sources, the GDP per-capita income data is collected from the World
Development indicators  extracted for  Nigeria.  The Inequality of income data  is  obtained from the
National Bureau of statistics of Nigeria. Data on Control of corruption were sourced from the Freedom
house now known as transparency international (IT)
 
 
 
 
4.0 Estimation of the Results
Table 1 Test for the Unit Root (Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips Perron Test
 
Series
ADF test
At level
 
First Difference 
Phillips Perron test
At level
 
First Difference
LnGDP -1.911448 -2.164056* -1.9111448 -1.881715*
LnEQ -1.067306 -3.778710* -1.058397 -3.778818*
LnCC -3.141732 -5.819301* -3.141732 -11.49360*
Note** * *** Indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
However, it should be noted from the table above the null hypothesis of not unit root cannot be rejected
at level. After first differencing the integration of the series where achieved as the variables become
stationary at 5% level of significance.
Bound Testing results for the existence of Long run relationship
Table 2. the Bound Testing Critical Values
Test statistics   Level  of
Significant
Critical Values with trend
   1(0) 1(1)
  1% 5.754        6.483
  5%
10%
3.993
3.247
4.533
3.773
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 F statistics
LnGDP                                    16.4707*
LnEQ                                       9.46*
LnCC                                       9.50*
Note: * ** *** reveals the level of significance of rejecting a null  hypothesis 1%, 5%, 10% level
accordingly.
Based on the result in table 2 and table 3 these indicate that the estimated F-test for the joint significant
of two of the variables is greater than the upper critical values at 5%.  Therefore, we can reject the null
hypothesis of no co-integration and concludes that there is a long run relationship between the series
under estimation. However, it is also evident that the estimated F-test does not fall below the critical
value. Thus, it is noted that the series of LnCC does not co- integrate because it value has fallen below
the critical value t 5% level of significant.
Table 4 Computed Long run Relationship Taking LnGDP as a Dependent Variable
 
Regressors              Coefficient       Standard Error                  T-Ratio [Prob]
 LnEQ                      5.8373                1.2284                          4.7519 [0.005]
 LnCC                  8.120107              2.877024                       2.8224[0.004]
 T                             3.17524                1.44002                       2.2050 [0.008]
            ARDL (1, 0, 1, and 0) selected based on Hannan-Quinn Criterion
From the above table 5 the LnEQ is statistically significant implying that inequality of income causes
economic  growth  in  the  long  run.  However,  it  was  similarly  found  that  LnCC  which  stand  for
corruption also causes economic growth in the long run. T stands for the trend which is also statistically
significant
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5 Dynamic Error Correction Mechanism Based on the Selected ARDL Models
 Dynamic LnGDPt Dynamic LnEQt Dynamic LnCCt
Regressors Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
DLnGDPt-1 1.6472**
(5.1699)
0.6386**
(-2.6225)
-0.0096779**
(-2.9493)
DLnEQt-1 1.152838**
(-5.0188)
0.18893**
(2.4187)
 23.5554
(0.92988)
DLnCCt-1   8.9598**
(2.5820)
0.007208
(1.2826)
70.5544**
(2.8265)
Ecmt-1 0.28218**
(-2.9319)
0.22567**
(-2.64452)
 1.4650**
(-5.5879)
 
ARDL (1, 0, 1, and 0) selected based on Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Residuals Diagnostic Checking
R-Squared    0.95365   R-Bar-Squared    0.91658
F (  3,   6)   34.2939 [. 000] DW-statistic   2.4583
The  results  from  table  5  above  reveals  that  the  error  correction  term  has  a  significant  positive
coefficient on the dynamic economic growth model implying that past changes in the economic growth
will be corrected back to the stable equilibrium stage by the current changes.
In  the  Dynamic  economic  growth  model  with  the  dependent  variable  DLnGDPt-1  the  estimated
coefficient of DLnEQt-1  is significantly positive implies that inequality of income rise together with
rising economic growth. This implies that in the case of Nigeria, inequality of income does not take the
inverted U shape Kuznet hypothesis. In addition, the estimated coefficient of DLnCCt-1 is significantly
positive.  This  implies  that  corruption  has  a  negative  impact  on  economic  growth  in  other  word
corruption in Nigeria is damaging to economic growth because an increase in the CPI scores means a
decrease in corruption. In the dynamic inequality of income equation the estimated coefficient of the
DLnGDPt-1 is  significantly  positive,  indicating  that  increase  in  economic  growth  will  cause  and
increase in inequality of income. Lastly, in the corruption dynamic equation the estimated coefficient of
DLnGDPt-1 is  significantly negative.  Indicating  that  an  increase  in  economic  growth will  cause  a
decrease in corruption in Nigeria, this is an interesting revelation to the Nigeria economy that fighting
corruption requires economic resource. Though the evidence of reverse causality does not solve an
intense  dispute  on  the  direction  of  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  corruption  this
remain inconclusive.
Figure 1. Stability Test of the Residuals
From figure  1  the  sensitivity  test  was  carried  out  and  the  result  suggests  that  the  parameters  of
economic growth has passed the test.  In other words there is stability in the coefficient of economic
growth.  Following the  decision  rules  that  the  CUSUM and CUSUMSQ of  the  GDP per-capita  of
income are found to have parallel lines within the 5% level of significance and does not crossed each
other.
5: Conclusions
This study examines the competing corruption growth hypothesis by including inequality of income.
The study addresses the methodological issues through the application of the ARDL approach to co-
integration. The results indicate that corruption in Nigeria is negatively affecting economic growth in
other word corruption is damaging the growth of the Nigerian economy. On the inequality of income
the results suggest that inequality of income increases with economic growth. This implies that the
structural shift in the process of economic growth in Nigeria does not follow the common assumption
in the economic theory which say that when an economic growth process generates movement of labor
from low productivity agriculture to the high productivity industrial sector this will improve the income
and welfare of the labor force and caused a client in the inequality of income. This also suggests in the
case of Nigeria inequality of income is moving with economic growth. We therefore, recommend that
for effective policy, careful understanding of different types of corruption and their linkage to economic
growth is important as each type of corruption deserves different types of policy subscription. Specific
governance  capacities  are  required  in  Nigeria  that  can  enable  state  to  enforce  specific  critical
governance’s capacities on critical sectors that are growth enhancing. Economic growth needs to be
propoor and inclusive. 
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